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THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
AN ESSAY ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND 
THE LANGUAGE OF FIRST 
AMENDMENT THEORY 
Lee C Bollinger* 
I would like to explore in this essay one aspect of the contemporary 
American debate over the theory of freedom of speech and press. The sub-
ject I want to address is this: whether the principle of freedom of speech 
and press should be viewed as protecting some personal or individual inter-
est in speaking and writing or whether it should be seen as fostering a col-
lective or public interest. Sometimes this issue is stated as being whether 
the first amendment protects a "right to speak" or a "right to hear," though 
in general the problem seems to be whether we should conceive of the prin-
ciple as securing speech against government intervention without regard to 
the potential benefits that speech offers for the larger society, or rather only 
because of them. ·-. 
These alternative statements of the purposes of the first amendment 
were present at the very beginnings of our modem free speech jurispru-
dence. Thus, we have Zechariah Chafee's early summary description of the 
purposes of the first amendment: 
The First Amendment protects two kinds of interests in free speech. There 
is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on 
matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the 
attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest 
course of action but carry it out in the wisest way. I 
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California 2 is another survey of 
first amendment functions that appears to encompass the two conceptions.3 
What is interesting about the development of first amendment theory is 
that these two characterizations should eventually come into deep conflict. 
With Chafee and Brandeis, for example, it seemed possible to point to these 
differing purposes without having to choose between them, or at least not 
all that much really turned on which one was chosen. In time, however, 
some people began to insist that a choice had to be made. Alexander 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1968, University of Oregon; J.D. 1971, 
Columbia University. - Ed. 
1. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1941). 
2. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
3. "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make 
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should 
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means." 274 U.S. at 
375. 
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Meiklejohn's essay, "Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government,"4 
published in 1948, seems to have been the turning point. 
In that essay, Meiklejohn denounced the theory that the first amend-
ment served to protect any kind of "individual interest" in speaking and 
insisted that its only function was to secure the collective interest in hearing 
all speech relevant to the democratic process. In words that are now famil-
iar, Meiklejohn stated that "the point of ultimate interest is not the words of 
the speakers, but the minds of the hearers," and, "[w]hat is essential is not 
that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."5 
In due course, this way of talking about free speech and press - as 
serving a public interest - came to dominate first amendment discourse. 
Over the last two decades, especially with cases involving the press, the id-
iom of the first amendment has taken a full turn in the direction of finding 
an identity between the principle of free speech and the advancement of the 
collective good.6 The logic that we routinely encounter posits that we have 
free speech because the society is better off receiving the information and 
ideas that come from open expression in an uninhibited atmosphere. 
Still, there has been a strong resistance movement to this way of think-
ing about free speech and press.7 Professor Ronald Dworkin, for example, 
labels the "individual right" perspective an approach based on "principle," 
and the "public interest" perspective an approach based on "policy," argu-
ing that the latter will lead to a weakening of first amendment protections: 
Suppose the question arises, for example, whether the Freedom of In-
formation Act should be amended so that the Disease Control Center is 
not required to make its reports available to reporters, or whether the 
Atomic Energy Commission should be allowed to enjoin a magazine from 
publishing an article that might make atomic information more readily 
available to foreign powers. The public's general interest in being well 
informed argues against confidentiality and for publication in both cases. 
But the public also has an interest in infection-free hospitals and in atomic 
security, and these two kinds of interests must be balanced, as in a cost-
benefit analysis, in order to determine where the public's overall interest 
lies. Suppose that in the long term (and taking side effects into account) 
the public would lose more overall if the information in question were 
published. Then it would be self-contradictory to argue that it must be 
published in the public's interest, and the argument for free speech, on 
grounds of policy, would be defeated.8 
It is preferable, Dworkin continues, to see this as a "genuine conflict" and 
not a "pseudo conflict between two aspects of the public's interest that may 
be dissolved in some judgment of its overall interest."9 By "genuine con-
4. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
5. Id. at 25. 
6. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975). 
7. See, e.g., B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS vs. PUBLIC ACCESS 31-36 (1976); L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 12-1, at 577-79 (1978); Dworkin, Is the Press Los-
ing the First Amendment?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1980, at 51-52, 57. 
8. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 52. 
9. Id. 
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fiict" Dworkin means we should "take free speech to be a matter of princi-
ple," as a guarantee that "individuals have the right to speak, not in order 
that others benefit, but because they would themselves suffer some unac-
ceptable injury or insult if censored," 10 and pit it against the "competing 
interests of the community as a whole." 11 Then, "[u]nless that competing 
interest is very great - unless publication threatens some emergency or 
other grave risk - the individual's right must outweigh the social interest, 
because that is what it means to suppose that he has this sort of right." 12 
But what exactly is the objection here? Is it that more speech will re-
ceive protection under a speaker's rights approach than under a public good 
approach? For the moment we may put aside the problem of whether the 
speech in question ought to be protected (a proposition we ought not simply 
to assume) and still wonder whether it really is simply a question of the 
scope of the first amendment that is the basis of the objection to the public 
interest perspective. The matter is not without complexity, and some of the 
things I shall say in due course bear on it, but it may be noted at the outset 
that it is hard to imagine real cases in which the same results could not be 
reached reasonably by both the speaker's rights and the public interest per-
spectives. In any event, we might well ask whether even if there will be 
some differential in the actual scope of first amendment protection for 
speech activity in society there are not other reasons why we should be wary 
of the public interest approach to the first amendment. It is to that question 
that I wish to tum our attention in this essay. 
Before proceeding with the inquiry, I would like to address two prelimi-
nary matters. The first is to distinguish the issue we address here from one 
other that is also involved in current discussion of free speech theory and 
that is sometimes tangled up with the individual interest/public interest de-
bate. In particular, we must keep in mind that the debate over the individ-
ual rights versus public interest orientation of free speech is independent of 
the dispute over whether the function of free speech should be conceived of 
as tied to the search for truth generally or, more narrowly, to the operation 
of the democratic political system. It is, in other words, quite possible to 
envision free speech as being related to the system of self-government and 
yet to see it as protecting the "individual right" of each citizen to participate 
in the process of political decisionmaking, instead of, as Meiklejohn did, as 
protecting the collectivity in receiving the information it needs to make 
good and wise decisions. The point is that the connection between the con-
cept of free speech and the subject matter of the speech protected under it is 
separate from the question of whose interest - the individual's or the soci-
ety's - is ultimately being advanced. In this sense, then, both Chafee and 
Meiklejohn conjoined two separable matters. Chafee, for example, defined 
the "individual interest" in personal terms (speech "on matters vital to them 
if life is to be worth living") and the "social interest" in terms of arriving at 
and implementing the best political decisions. 
Finally, I should add a word of explanation as to why this essay can be 
considered relevant to this volume, dedicated as it is to Eric Stein. I have 
10. Id. at 51-52. 
11. Id. at 52. 
12. Id. 
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two considerations to suggest in support of the essay's inclusion. The first is 
a belief, though I cannot at this point be sure, that the American experience 
in this area is parallel to that in other countries, notably those of Western 
Europe. As I look at decisions like the famous Sunday Times13 case of the 
European Court of Human Rights, I see a striking resemblance to the idiom 
employed by American courts in their efforts to develop a free press juris-
prudence.14 That decision, like our New York Times v. Sullivan, 15 strikes a 
tone for thinking about the press that resonates with ours, focusing on the 
relationship between the concept of free press and a democratic system of 
government and the role of the press as mediator between the government 
and the people. My hope, therefore, is that the discussion of this essay will 
provide an interesting comparative case study. 
My second reason is entirely personal: Eric Stein has been a patient and 
wise colleague. His interest in international human rights, stemming as it 
does from a profound sensitivity to the dilemmas confronting those ideals 
in contemporary life, has been inspirational. For me, therefore, anything I 
have to say on this subject seems related to him. 
I 
The thesis I wish to advance is quite simple to state. It is this: The 
characterization an advocate selects to explain or justify a "right" is really 
best understood as reflecting a general, and complex, identity desired by the 
advocate and a relationship between the advocate and others in the society. 
What is truly significant, therefore, about the shift in justification of first 
amendment press rights to a public interest idiom is to be found in an ex-
ploration of the identity being proffered for the press (by itself and others) 
and the proposed relationship with other members of the society that that 
identity would establish. 
No group of people, of course, has a single "identity" or "relationship 
with others," any more than a single individual does. It is always a matter 
of a mixture of identities, one of degree and emphasis. But the degree and 
emphasis can be critical in determining the shift of behavior - as it would 
be if university professors came to think of themselves primarily as teachers 
13. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (Ser. A, No. 30), 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (Eur. Ct. Hum. 
Rts. 1979), digested in 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONY. HUM. RTs. 402. 
14. (F]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society; ... it is applicable not only to information or ideas that are favourably received 
or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, 
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. 
These principles are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned. They 
are equally applicable to the field of the administration of justice, which serves the inter-
ests of the community at large and requires the co-operation of an enlightened public. 
There is general recognition of the fact that the courts cannot operate in a vacuum. 
Whilst they are the forum for the settlement of disputes, this does not mean that there can 
be no prior discussion of disputes elsewhere, be it in specialised journals, in the general 
press or amongst the public at large. Furthermore, whilst the mass media must not over-
step the bounds imposed in the interests of the proper administration of justice, it is in-
cumbent on them to impart information and ideas concerning matters that come before 
the courts just as in other areas of public interest. Not only do the media have the task of 
imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. 
2 E.H.R.R. at 280 (1979). 
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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instead of as writers and scholars. Furthermore, as with any way of think-
ing, or identity, what we are speaking about here cannot be reduced to a 
few paragraphs, and I do not propose to try to do so. But we can begin to 
elicit some of the critical, and perhaps obvious, elements involved and so at 
least provide the preparations for future explorations. 
What, then, is being proposed in this regard, when representa!ives of the 
press defend the rights and powers of the press in terms of serving the "col-
lective" or "public interest"? In a sense, the answer is fairly apparent. The 
press is defining itself as the supplier of "what the public wants," which in 
most instances will be defined as the information and ideas the people will 
use to exercise their roles as citizens, consumers, investors, entertainment-
goers and the like. But there is usually something more, for something 
must be added to explain why the press should be free to attend to the 
public's needs. The press is saying it is "responsible," that it can be trusted 
to handle the power it wields; that it will be honest, straightforward, bal-
anced, fair and decent. 
These virtues may seem too general and universal to be of any help in 
understanding what is happening to the press within today's legal world, 
but the selection of justifications for power and status is actually quite 
broad and the choices made within that range are revealing. Consider al-
ternatives: The press might very well claim its rights on the basis, not that it 
is generally good, but that it is simply a survivor of the marketplace like any 
other business; that journalists possess the knowledge, expertise and profes-
sional training that make them uniquely capable of performing this social 
function; or, to take other historically common justifications of power, that 
the press is the contemporary bearer of an aristocratic heritage, or perhaps 
even possessed of a divine mandate. Most important, the press is no longer 
asserting that what it does is nobody's business but its own. Its very argu-
ments in self-defense concede its potential for inflicting individual and so-
cial harm, as well as the legitimacy and importance of self-restraint in the 
exercise of its powers. 
Now, a question of some importance is this: Just why should the press 
have turned to this particular method of self-justification? Here, again, I 
think the answer is built into the structure of the American press, and in 
particular into the convergence of two very well-known phenomena: 
namely, the increased capacity of the media to reach larger and larger audi-
ences and the simultaneous decline in the number of people who control the 
existing outlets. 
The most significant development in the press in the twentieth century, 
besides its increased capacity to reach so many people, has been its growing 
concentration. The steadily dwindling number of newspapers in the cities 
across the country, a trend which has now resulted in there being only a 
handful of cities in which there is any genuine competition, has been noted 
and bemoaned by many, but little has been done to reverse the process. 
Nonetheless, the "power" of the press has become a focus of rather constant 
attention and, like any locus of unchecked power within the society, has 
made the press a constant target for criticism and cries for reform. Concen-
tration of control within the press raises the most profound issue for its 
continued freedom from public control: Can we continue to live with a 
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concept of liberty for the press when the circumstances under which that 
liberty was originally conceived have changed drastically? 
To observe the enhancement of the power of the press and its growing 
concentration is of course to tread a well-worn path. The reality of the phe-
nomenon pointed to is indubitable; whether a remedy is required, and what 
that remedy might look like, are matters open to reasonable difference of 
opinion. These, however, are not my immediate concern. All I wish to do 
here is to suggest that we try to trace a linkage between this highly signifi-
cant issue of the legitimacy of the press's power and social position and the 
language it regularly uses in defending its constitutional claims. 
It is the enormously enhanced position of social power wielded by cur-
rent members of the mass media that mandates a self-presentation in the 
language of the "public interest." When the potential for social harm is so 
augmented, when inevitably there will be doubts about whether the original 
conditions justifying an expanded range of liberties have been irrevocably 
altered by succeeding events, it behooves those who sit in the positions of 
control to adopt a posture that minimizes the risks of harm with promises of 
good behavior. 
Ironically, the very institution that the press has turned to for support of 
its liberties has itself suffered from similar problems of legitimacy. The 
court system - and, of course, especially the Supreme Court - is the one 
political institution in our federal structure that lacks an uncomplicated 
democratic pedigree, and this uncertainty about its status in relation to the 
other two branches has, as everyone knows, been the cause of seemingly 
endless challenges to its actions and equally endless attempts to account for 
its role in American politics. I am not interested here in either recounting 
these debates or in trying to add to them. What is important for my pur-
poses is the fact that they exist and that they establish an atmosphere in 
which the exercise of judicial power is of uncertain legitimacy. 
Just as we do with the press, therefore, we find the Supreme Court com-
monly characterizing its function as that of protecting the people and their 
democratic sovereignty against the government, in spite of the reality that 
democratic processes are being regularly upset in the enforcement of consti-
tutional liberties. There is, then, a convergence of interest between both the 
press and the courts in turning to a collective, or public interest account of 
their jointly exercised powers. The most striking example of this conver-
gence in the modem case law is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 16 where 
the fragility of both the press and the Court were being tested by Alabama's 
use of libel actions against desegregation speech. There is evident in the 
case a feeling of mutual vulnerability and joint dependency. In any event, 
that coincidence of interest produced our modem idiom of freedom of 
speech and press - the idiom of Meiklejohn and the "public interest" ori-
entation of the first amendment. 
In seeing this convergence of interests between the press and the Court, 
we are also in a better position to understand the more modem divergence 
between these same two institutions. It is of course a known fact of life that 
the transition from the Warren Court to the Burger Court has meant a soft-
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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ening of the promised protections arising out of the Sullivan pact between 
the press and the Court. But as has been repeatedly pointed out, the press 
has won as well as lost in the Burger court, although the clamor from the 
press over its losses has frequently proclaimed nothing short of a total judi-
cial abandonment of the first amendment. At times, in fact, the reaction of 
the press has been so extreme and exaggerated that even the moderate and 
liberal members of the Court (notably Justice Brennan) have felt compelled 
to depart from the protocol of judicial nonparticipation in public debate in 
order to chastise the press for indulging in a kind of juvenile overreaction to 
its defeats.17 
I do not wish to defend these overreactions of the press, but I do think 
they have at their core a legitimate concern, though it is not really the prac-
tical consequences of actual decisions that have gone against them. The 
real problem many members of the press have with the Burger Court, I 
suspect, has less to do with the results and more to do with the characteriza-
tion of the press by the Court. Though we frequently overlook it, the courts 
- and, here again, especially the Supreme Court - perform a dual func-
tion: They resolve actual disputes and make law, but they also articulate a 
vision or set of visions about how to think about the world in which we live. 
In this latter function the courts are opinion-makers, speakers in the mar-
ketplace, in a very literal sense. One can debate just how great an influence 
the Court has on shaping the attitudes of the American people - I for one 
would estimate it, relative to other speakers, as being fairly high - but 
there seems to me little room for denying its having any role altogether. 
This means that even when the Court reaches a "favorable" result it can 
simultaneously undermine its value for the press by the way it speaks about 
the press. 
This is precisely what happened in one of the most favorable press deci-
sions, Miami Herald v. Tornillo. 18 Split into two parts, the argument of the 
Miami Herald opinion reads like the meanderings of a divided personality. 
In the first the press is described as excessively concentrated and monopo-
listic, as being fundamentally altered from the press that the Framers 
thought was in need of special protections, and so on. 19 In the second part, 
the decision gives the impression that the "rights" of journalists and editors 
are sacrosanct territory in our society, worthy of our trust while the govern-
ment is not.20 Always ambiguous, however, the opinion, even at the end, 
may be read as saying that the press is bad but unfortunately there's noth-
ing we can do about it - a reinforcement of the troublesome theme devel-
oped in the first part of the opinion.21 
17. See Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979). 
18. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
19. 418 U.S. at 247-54. 
20. 418 U.S. at 254-58. 
21. 418 U.S. at 258 ("It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of ... 
[the editorial] process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free 
press as they have evolved to this time.") 
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But what is the explanation for the concerns so frequently voiced about 
the shift to thinking about press rights (and more generally, about free 
speech rights) in terms of the advancement of the public interest? Here I 
think we must try to understand what happens to an institution that em-
braces an identity of being a servant of the public interest. 
Of course, not every group of individuals or institution will necessarily 
react in the same way to the same self-characterization; differences can be 
expected to manifest themselves depending upon the functions performed 
by the group or institution, its former identity and the characteristics of the 
people involved. Generalizations about probable consequences are, there-
fore, not in order. But we may still ask what is to be feared in vesting the 
institution of the press with the self-image of being the agent, or represen-
tative, of the "public"? 
The problem is the risk that the press will come to think of itself as 
possessed of a kind of indefinite but powerful mandate to ferret out and 
rectify wrongs in the society and in doing so will end up either performing 
what have until now been primarily official functions, but without the re-
straints we have so carefully built into the official processes, or actually 
exceeding the boundaries of legitimate official action. Perhaps there are 
already indications that this has occurred. 
When, a few years ago, the television show, "Sixty Minutes" produced a 
program to examine the propriety of some of its journalistic techniques in 
uncovering fraudulent, deceitful and illegal behavior in society, it displayed 
an unfortunately commonly encountered attitude among journalists. 
Whether it is proper to engage in illegal activity in order to discover how 
easy it is to do so, to employ false identities to gain access to privately run 
business operations as a means of uncovering fraudulent and improper 
practices, to use the technique known as the "ambush interview" in which 
people are suddenly confronted, while the cameras are rolling, with the ac-
cusations of wrongdoing - these were the types of techniques practiced 
and (with one exception) defended by the producers of the show. What was 
interesting, and in some degree disturbing, about the self-critique was not 
the practices themselves but the general attitude that lay behind the defense 
of their use. It was clear that "Sixty Minutes" regarded itself as essentially 
a kind of law enforcement agency, vested with the mission of detecting and 
disclosing improper behavior in the society. Yet, despite having under-
taken this self-appointed task, the "Sixty Minutes" people did not seem to 
see, let alone properly assess, the relevance of many parallel limits that we 
routinely impose on the official system of civil and criminal law enforce-
ment. Quite obviously, both the presumption of innocence and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, to take but two examples, are elemental 
bulwarks of our system of criminal justice. They stand guard against what 
we have come to think of as inherent biases in our thinking that detrimen-
tally skew our approach to ascertaining the guilt or innocence of those 
charged with wrongdoing. Yet neither were raised as potentially relevant 
guideposts to thinking about the parallel issues in a system of journalistic 
criminal justice. 
This of course is not to say that precisely the same rules that govern 
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official behavior ought to govern unofficial activities such as journalists en-
gage in, nor, certainly, that the press ought not to be engaged at all in ferret-
ing out wrongful conduct. The point is simply that there are serious risks of 
injustice and improper behavior whenever anyone - official or unofficial -
envisions for themselves a mandate to expose and rectify the wrongdoing 
within the society. And, a self-conscious acknowledgement of the limits of 
one's capacity to do good, matched with a comparable recognition of one's 
capacity to inflict serious harm, is a minimal condition of undertaking such 
an enterprise. Yet that is precisely the problem for the press: Institution-
ally disinclined to see itself as a semi- or quasi-official organization, for to 
do so seems a partial acknowledgement of the relevance of the limitations 
imposed on official behavior, it is nonetheless inclined to cast itself as the 
true representative and protector of the people's interests. 
III 
The concern, however, is not limited to problems with the behavior of 
the press alone. It also extends to the potential behavior of the public, and 
in tracing this concern we can learn something especially interesting about 
first amendment thinking generally and perhaps even something useful for 
dealing with that perennial quest of fashioning a viable theory of the first 
amendment. 
The problem with the public interest perspective is that it seems to place 
control over speech freedom in the hands of the public itself. One of the 
things that makes a public interest reference attractive in free speech rhet-
oric is, doubtlessly, that it is largely an abstraction - it assumes a body of 
people so large that consultation with them over the attribution is usually 
impracticable. But not always. Sometimes "the public," speaking as a 
democratic majority, can make its will known quite clearly and firmly, and 
when it does, anyone who has claimed the status of the public's agent will 
be duty bound to accept its will. 
This would seem to be a reasonable fear behind any turn to a justifica-
tion of press rights based on the idea of serving the public will. But the fear 
should be clarified: The problem is not simply in what a "fair" evaluation 
of the competing public "interests" (both in the benefits of the speech itself 
and in the avoidance of the costs of that same speech) will yield in terms of 
the scope of protection for speech activities but in obtaining any "fair" eval-
uation in the first place. In short, the real concern underlying the objections 
to the public interest idiom is that it seems to vest in the public a real choice 
- as the ultimate party in interest - over what level of protection for 
speech we will have, and the public is not to be trusted with exercising that 
choice wisely. In the face of this reality, the preferable course to some has 
been to turn to a position in which free speech is defended as a matter of 
"right" or "principle," that is, as something beyond the realm of discussion. 
In fact, the deeper one probes into the strategic thinking in the first 
amendment area, the more one discovers - and, depending on one's view-
point, to one's discomfort - that a good deal of first amendment "reason-
ing" can be understood as directed at making reconsideration of any first 
amendment issue virtually unthinkable. Perhaps the most striking example 
of this methodology is Justice Black's well-known insistence that the Ian-
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guage of the first amendment ("no law") foreclosed any independent exam-
ination of the first amendment protections the Court was extending. Along 
with the repeated invocation of "the Framers' intent" and the seemingly 
settled "history" of the free speech and press clause, the "no law" technique 
represents a familiar fortress strategy for presenting the first amendment. 
I do not wish here to explore at length the merits and demerits of these 
ways of thinking and talking about the first amendment, but only to clarify 
the key concerns behind the objections to the public interest idiom. It 
should be observed, however, that this desire to protect something you 
value by making its abandonment or modification unthinkable is one of the 
primary motivations behind the suppression of speech in the first place. It 
does seem anomalous, to say the least, for the process that condemns that 
practice to employ it itself. The real difficulty, however, is more than mak-
ing sure you practice what you preach, but in identifying and understand-
ing what the ultimate purposes of the first amendment really are. It would 
seem that among those ultimate purposes ought to be that of developing the 
capacity of mind to avoid such patterns of deception, both of others and of 
oneself. 
At the very least, we should begin with a distinction in our thinking 
about the public interest perspective on the first amendment. The problem 
with it may be thought to rest, not in the general idea that the first amend-
ment should be thought about in terms of its advancement of the social 
good, but in the unfortunately narrow range of considerations we presently 
associate with the social good. A "cost-benefit" analysis for the first amend-
ment is undesirable, in other words, because of its stunted conception of 
what the first amendment is all about. When Dworkin objects to the public 
interest perspective through his examples of the Disease Control Center and 
the Atomic Energy Commission, he defines the free speech interest of the 
public as that of "being well informed." This is of a piece with most con-
temporary talk about the advantages of the first amendment: It brings us 
the information we need to make decisions as citizens and truth-seekers and 
the like. This is a pragmatic style of thinking of a most limited kind, and, 
importantly, it seems to neglect consideration of a more fundamental sym-
bolic and aspirational role for the first amendment. The solution, however, 
is not to retreat from the task of understanding and articulating just how 
society is better off with a first amendment such as our intuitions tell us we 
ought to have, to a kind of uncommunicative stance of "principle," but 
rather to engage in that task of enlarging our conception of the relevant 
considerations. 
The public interest perspective, therefore, is dangerous because our the-
ory of the fust amendment is itself too narrow and undeveloped. 
IV 
I have argued that the best way to understand the prevailing "theory" 
about the first amendment serving a "public interest," and the concerns that 
many people seem to have with that theory, is to see it as a kind of short-
hand expression of a set of identities for the various participants involved in 
free speech litigation (the courts, the public and the speakers, which of 
course includes the press) and of the various relationships between these 
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parties. Pursuing that line of inquiry, I have suggested that we see it as the 
language of those whose exercise of power (be it informational or judicial) 
is precarious - that is to say, of questionable legitimacy - and as embody-
ing a kind of promise to behave in certain ways in exercising that power 
(responsible, objective and the like). And I have indicated what I think is at 
the root of our fears about individuals and institutions that assert the au-
thority to act on behalf of someone assumed to possess ultimate sover-
eignty, especially when the principle is most often a dissembling 
abstraction. 
The interest of what we find in such an inquiry is accentuated by a com-
parison with other roads not taken; that is to say, of other means of repre-
senting oneself as holding power legitimately. It is noteworthy, I think, that 
the press has thus far chosen not to rest its case on any claim of special 
expertise in acquiring and disseminating the "news." There is perhaps 
some suggestion of expertise in the modem development of the concept of 
"editorial autonomy," which has appeared in a few cases like Miami Her-
ald.22 But it has not been more explicit than that. 
This omission is of a piece with a more general ambivalence within the 
American press about its identity. The press in this country appears to be 
somewhat uncomfortable with any sense of itself as an institution made up 
of "professionals." The ambiguous status of journalism and communica-
tions departments within our universities bespeaks a more widespread divi-
sion within the press about its status.23 In large measure, the issue seems to 
be where the press stands: as an outsider, reporting on and criticizing 
events within, or as an insider, subject to the same standards and expecta-
tions that govern those who are themselves participants in the events cov-
ered by the press. More than most groups (compare lawyers, for example) 
the press is in conflict over its relationship to the world on which it regularly 
reports. 
Here, I think, lies another part of the attraction to the dissenting rhetoric 
of "speakers rights." For it is the identity offered by that "theoretical" ac-
count of free speech protections that seemingly best matches the underlying 
need of many journalists to think of themselves as totally independent peo-
ple, unconstrained by the expectations regularly imposed on those who in-
habit the realms of officialdom and the professional class. It is the image of 
the wily, Odyssean reporter, employing clever techniques and staunchly 
maintaining his or her independence, that is so much at odds with the "pub-
lic interest," "right to hear" idiom of contemporary first amendment 
discourse. 
What this also demonstrates, in part, is that the identities connected 
with our first amendment idiom are really always going to be subject to 
evaluation in terms of their advancement of the "public interest." It is not 
22. "The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limita-
tions on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials -
whether fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment." Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
23. See, e.g., Journalism Educators JJehate Strategies, Technology and Ties lo the Media, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1984, at 11, col. l (city ed.); Salmans, TV's Newscasters Give Low Marks 
to Newcomers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1984, § 2, at l, col. I. 
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the case that one identity "serves" the public interest and the other does not; 
though the behavior under either identity will differ in significant respects, 
each will be judged ultimately by the measure of its general value for the 
society. 
What is of special interest in the change in first amendment idiom to-
wards the "public interest," "right to hear" language is the progressive shift 
within the American press towards a professional identity. We can expect, I 
think, to see a continuous movement within the press towards taking on the 
characteristics of the other professions, including a more developed system 
of ethical self-evaluation. The recent demise of the National News Coun-
cil24 only highlights the absence of - and need for - an institutional or-
ganization within the press vested with the task of systematically addressing 
the complex issues that an increasingly powerful and professional press will 
inevitably have to face. 
24. See National News Council Will Dissolve, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1984, at 11, col. I (city 
ed.). 
